The arrest of Thinley Gyatso, the de-facto representative of the Dalai Lama in Nepal, which was reported by IANS on 07 March 2010, as well as the arrest of several groups of Tibetans who entered the country clandestinely earlier in the year, bear witness to the People's Republic of China's (PRC) increasing efforts to exert influence in Nepal. This Special Report provides the context to these developments by highlighting the current state of the Sino-Nepali rapport for which the long border that Nepal shares with the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) is a defining element. As a whole, Nepal, one of the poorest countries in the world, is the net loser in a deeply asymmetric relationship. It has vulnerable border regions where China is currently actively establishing its presence, and its trade balance with China is hopelessly skewed. Chinese development efforts in Nepal appear to serve less Nepali needs than the PRC's vested interests, in particular the development of the TAR as a bridge to South Asia. The benefits of Chinese investment in Nepal have yet to be felt and interaction, though superficially cordial, is often uneasy, mainly because China's presence in Nepal is marked more by determination than skill. Still, the prospect of benefiting from China's economic boom and diminishing the almost total and often resented dependence on India, has fostered a willingness to cooperate with China, in particular among Nepali elites. Concessions relating to the Tibet issue are one of the few cards they have at their disposal. Nepal however is in a dilemma, since despite speculation about its future, it is still far more dependent on help from India and developed countries who insist on Nepal's adherence to international agreements on refugees. The way ahead will therefore depend on how much determination, skills and energy these international partners will be ready to invest into facing China's advance in Nepal(1).
Tedious border
Seven counties of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR)(2) border 14 districts of Nepal(3). Closely linked to Tibet by history, language and culture, most people in these high-mountain, sparsely populated districts are followers of Tibetan Buddhism. In the past, trade and cultural relationships across more than 60 mountain passes were prolific, but they were dealt a devastating blow by the advent of Chinese rule in Tibet. Nepal is one of the few of its 15 neighbours with whom the PRC has never had any serious disputes, and in principle, all issues related to the common border were settled by the 1960s. A trade agreement was signed in 1968, in theory allowing barter trade for locals from both sides living close to the border, and by 1973 a Nepal Trans-Himalayan Association had been formed. Regular trade with Tibet was later agreed via three trade points, although to date only the Tatopani - Zhangmu (Khasa) - route(4) is actually functioning.
Zhangmu/Dram |
Although things are superficially more settled at the Tatopani-Zhangmu border point, where most tourists cross and intensive trade activities take place, there is also a great deal of arbitrariness and imbalance here too. Many Nepalese who travel across the border on a day permit to purchase cheap manufactured products in Zhangmu's shops, a popular excursion even from 80km away in Kathmandu, face rudeness and apparently random implementation of regulations. An example of this is the way Chinese border guards vary the opening times of the border gate. Nepali businessmen also complain about harassment. Foreigners, who cross the border are treated with more respect, but those found hanging around on the Nepali side are often accosted by what seem to be Nepali onlookers attempting to intimidate them, for instance, when they take photos of the bridge across the border, although this as such is not forbidden.
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Whereas Nepali border guards do not cross into Tibet unless invited to do so, Chinese guards make frequent appearances on the Nepali side, mostly in civilian dress but without attempting to conceal their identity. Chinese personnel were clearly in evidence during the events of 2008 in Tibet, apparently as part of an intimidation strategy targeted at potential troublemakers. The uninhibited presence of Chinese officers in Tatopani and their imperious behaviour has led to a number of incidents. The most serious occurred in July 2006 when a car belonging to a Chinese official hit and seriously hurt two Nepalese. Police at the customs checkpoint were reluctant to take any action against the driver of the vehicle involved and released him after consultations with Chinese officials. Angry locals therefore stormed the checkpoint, demanding action against the driver. A panicking Nepali policeman then opened fire, killing a local resident and triggering further protests, leaving dozens of trucks stranded at the border.
Nepal and China signed a first protocol agreeing boundary maps in 1962 and a second one in 1978. Although both countries had agreed to review the maps every 10 years, they have not done since 1988. In June 2009, following complaints of border encroachment at Kimathanka, Sankhuwasabha district, in Eastern Nepal, Nepali officials conducted an inspection for the first time in the region in 40 years, but their Chinese counterparts barred the team from reaching Dendang, saying that they needed higher-level authorisation to let them in.
Nepal's road network in mountainous areas is largely underdeveloped. During summer 2005, Nepal's Maoist insurgency(6) had massively disrupted traffic in remote areas adjacent to the Tibetan border and northern districts like Jumla and Humla faced a scarcity of food and essential goods. An agreement with Beijing signed in summer 2004, allowed for supplies to be taken through the Tatopani-Zhangmu border post, across Tibet and from there back to Nepal's northern districts. In August 2006 however, following the re-installation of democracy, bilateral relations reached a low point and Chinese authorities temporarily withdrew from the agreement, arguing that trucks could hide Tibetans clandestinely crossing to Nepal. This had the effect of exacerbating the transport shortage problem.
From March 2008, access to Mustang by the UN's World Food Programme (WFP) was again hindered by Chinese restrictions following rising tensions in Tibet. A severe drought in the northern district made the problem worse. A similar situation was reported in Taplejung, Sankhuwasabha, and Gorkha districts. Some border checkpoints re-opened on 10 July to ease the food shortage, but they were closed within three days in order to check for alleged infiltration into Tibet before and during the Beijing Olympics. In April 2009, Qiangba Puncog, then chairman of the TAR government (governor), meeting the Nepali Foreign Minister in Lhasa, announced that the TAR would provide annual aid worth three million Yuan (UK£297,000; US$441,000; EUR€330,000) to northern Nepal for five years commencing in 2009. "The economic development of northern Nepal is relatively backward due to inconvenient transportation. We will offer grain and basic commodities to Nepal after further negotiations with [the] Nepali government", he said. In effect, Kathmandu is placing a crucial function of the Nepali government in the hands of the Chinese authorities and making them dependent on their good will. The Chinese presence in the border region is politically flanked by the development of the Nepal China Himalayan Friendship Society (NCHFS). The NCHFS, headed by a former Nepali MP, Ananda Prasad Pokharel, is currently expanding its network to all districts of Nepal along the Tibetan border.
On 15-16 August 2009, officials from Nepal and China met in Lhasa to discuss current border issues. The agenda reflected the different perceptions of what the border problems are and each side's expectations. Both agreed that border trade needed regulation and cross-border crime had to be tackled, but definitions of these issues were at variance. Next to better access to remote regions via Tibetan roads, Nepal's concerns were mainly smuggling, including wildlife products, and manufactured goods which escape the scope of Nepal's tax offices, but also Chinese-made weapons and fake currency as, again and again, these emerge in Nepal(7). The Chinese side focused more on what both sides have agreed to call "illegal immigration from Tibet" or "human trafficking" - terms coined by China to refer to Tibetans clandestinely crossing the border to meet the Dalai Lama. As in a previous meeting in February, the Chinese side raised the issue of a future extradition treaty with Nepal. This divergence on agenda priorities might also explain why China in February had proposed setting up a high-level mechanism to look after border security and management, while Nepal favoured a local mechanism in the districts bordering the two countries. The issue of border control was further discussed during various Nepal-China meetings since then, in particular during Nepal's Prime Minister's visit to China in December 2009 as well as that of Home Minister Rawal in February 2010.
The current stage of these discussions is unclear. Nepal's press announced that the groups of Tibetans who were en route to India to meet the Dalai Lama, a purpose for which they would be unable to obtain legal documents from the Chinese authorities(8), and were arrested in Nepal in early 2010 might be handed over to the Chinese authorities, but they were eventually placed in the hands of the UNHCR in Kathmandu. Nepal is in a difficult position in this matter since it is being pressured by China to effectively support their border forces in policing the frontier, but also by international donors, upon whom it financially depends on, to adhere to international agreements on refugees. Bizarrely, the result of this impasse thus far is that China's attempts to gloss over the embarrassing border-crossing issue by pressurising Nepal towards greater toughness on its behalf has highlighted the problem internationally. In any case, with 700 arrivals until October 2009, the number of Tibetans willing to cross the border has been picking up again after a decade low of just 450 in 2008, as the border, following the protests in Tibet, was almost hermetically closed. Nowadays the refugees prefer the route that takes them through the region around Tatopani/Zhangmu, but some occasionally use the west route through Nepal's Humla and Mustang districts. Even Tibetans coming out via Bhutan must first make their way through the Nepali capital before they can proceed to India, because the UNHCR office responsible for Tibetans is in Kathmandu. In a new development, some Tibetans, mainly those better educated and financially more independent manage to obtain visas for India from the Chinese mainland and come legally by flying from Beijing or Chengdu, bypassing Nepal altogether.
Pipe - and other dreams – Aid
The increase by 50% of the PRC's annual aid allowance to Nepal during 2009 made international headlines. Seen in context however, the impact of the gesture is limited and does not fit well with the PRC's reputation for delivering aid with no strings attached. The route to the increase was long and complex. It appears to have been first considered in 2005 when the Chinese authorities were keen to support the king who had seized power and Nepal was internationally isolated. But it was only in July 2006, as Beijing unexpectedly faced a resentful civilian government in Kathmandu, and efforts were made to regain ground lost because of this political blunder, that the increase was "discussed" by Chinese Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Wu Taiwei during a visit to Nepal. Discussions progressed when Nepal's then Foreign Minister Upendra Yadav's visited China in 2008. At the time, Beijing complained that the Nepali government was not doing enough to control Tibetan protests in Kathmandu, while at the same time began offering further incentives. The increase, to 150 million Yuan (UK£14.5m; US$22m; EUR€16m), might appear spectacular, and it was certainly meant to, but relative to the very large amounts of aid Nepal receives internationally it is not that substantial. Although a close neighbour of Nepal, the new aid package provided by China amounts to only about two-thirds of that provided by Denmark, for instance, or half of what Germany donates, a quarter of what the World Bank gives and it is US$5 million short of the UK aid agency DIFID's budget for Nepal(9). In addition, it remains to be seen how much of a free hand Nepal will be given to spend the Chinese funds.
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China also has a role in Nepal's infrastructure development. No prospect has fired Nepalese imaginations more than that of connecting to the PRC's railway and pipeline networks, and statements by Chinese diplomats have been a balancing act between fuelling such hopes, while remaining non-binding in nature. The life sustaining provision of oil from India, currently Nepal's only supplier, is subject to regular and paralysing shortages, making the prospect of lessening Nepal's dependence on its southern neighbour, through an extension to Zhangmu of the over 1000km oil pipeline between Golmud and Lhasa particularly seductive. On 14 January 2009, China's then ambassador to Nepal, Cheng Xia Ling, claimed in response to the Nepali demands that China was "working towards developing a permanent and long term mechanism to supply petrol to Nepal from China"(10). Considering the technological challenges involved, the establishment of a pipeline across south Tibet to supply Nepal would mean a huge investment that would be unlikely to provide any returns for the foreseeable future. Besides, the real issue is not India's unwillingness to provide petrol, but that cash-starved Nepal is often not in a position to pay for it, a problem that would be no different if China was a provider.
Since the opening of the Golmud-Lhasa railway in July 2006, Nepal has been enthusiastically pressing for its extension to the Nepal-Tibet border. Even one year before the railway reached Lhasa, Nepali government representatives were already taking any opportunity to lobby TAR and Beijing officials for some firm commitment. A leading economic journal in Nepal wrote: "Once the 770km Lhasa-Khasa railway (...) comes into operation, Nepal (...) can materialise its plan to re-establish itself as a transit point between India and China; such a situation will have far reaching economic benefits"(11). Chinese representatives fed this hope. On 14 January 2008, the Chinese ambassador, Cheng Xia Ling, declared: "The China-Tibet railway link will not end in Lhasa, as we have plans to expand it up to the Nepalese border". In April of the same year, Ai Ping, director general of China's international department, and then Nepali Prime Minister G. P. Koirala were said to have "discussed the benefits of the project" and Nepali officials reported that the railway link would be in place within five years. However, on 19 August 2008, when Wang Yongping, spokesperson for the Ministry of Railways, announced that six new railway lines were planned on the Tibetan Plateau, he conceded that his ministry has no plans at present to extend the network to Nepal. In fact, at the beginning of 2010, reports in the Chinese press made it clear that even the Lhasa-Shigatse line is still awaiting Beiing's go ahead(12).
Since the 1960s, the PRC has undertaken several road construction projects in Nepal. These are officially declared to be development aid but in contrast to comparable projects run by other nations in Nepal, they are targeted less at providing much-needed Nepalese inner-connectivity, and more at establishing strong links between Nepal and Tibet/China, and ultimately India. The first such road project was between Kathmandu-Tatopani/Zhangmu, also known as the Friendship Highway, or Arniko Highway(13).
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A second road, long planned but only given serious consideration in the 1990s and not formally agreed until 2001, will cross Rasuwa district and join the main traditional trade route through Kyirong(14) and China's G219 highway on the Tibetan side. The advantage of this route is that it runs through comparatively smooth and broader terrain, allowing for much higher transport capacities and easy extension(15). The road is expected to be completed by mid-2011, and will allow for a faster access to Kathmandu from the border. More importantly, it will also offer the option of bypassing the bottleneck that is the Kathmandu valley and provide Chinese goods a quick axis to the incomparably larger markets of India (less than 150 kilometres as the crow flies, and on smooth terrain). Once this road is in operation, Nepal could become simply a transit zone in the very same way that Tibet is used(16) for the transit of goods from Mainland China to Nepal. It is likely that, as in Tibet, some meagre benefits from the transit might trickle down to locals, but the traders at both ends of the chain will make the real profits.
The new Rasuwa Road will allow for a fast link between Kyirong, TAR, and... |
A third axis is being planned for the Bajhang, Humla and Darchula districts in the far western part of Nepal that would connect the town of Simikot with western Tibet. Annual trade fairs used to be held on the Tibetan side of the border until 1959, but since then the region has been, like many other parts of the border, a desolate dead end. It would probably remain so if it were not for Mount Kailash just over the border in Tibet, attracting tourists and pilgrims; thousands of Indians visit the holy site each year. So far, they have to be flown in or travel via Kathmandu and Tatopani, so that costs and hardships involved considerably reduce the potential of the region. Unsurprisingly, it is Ngari prefecture, where Mount Kailash is situated that is particularly pushing this project.
Trade imbalance and patchy investment
The real volume of the trade between Nepal and China is a matter of great confusion. Statistics published by both countries do not contribute to clarity, as they are calculated according to different time spans and apparently different US dollar rates. Most observers estimate that exchanges are not fully officially recorded and hence partly illegal. Finally, there are reports that vested interests by companies involved in the trade lead to distortions of already imprecise Nepali statistics. What appears certain is that a large amount of the trade between the two countries, probably more than 70%, is by road, i.e. via the TAR for which Nepal is by far the biggest foreign trade partner. It is also certain that Nepali exports to the TAR and China make up a negligible share of the volume of trade. They have been in decline compared with imports into Nepal by a rate of possibly 219% between 2003 and 2008. This is even though Nepal could markedly raise its exports to China after reaching a historic low around 2006-7(17). According to Nepali officials, the trade deficit between Nepal and China was about NRs.21.5 billion (UK£196m; US$295m; EUR€216m) in 2008-9 and China is Nepal's second major trading partner for imports, albeit far behind India, but ranked at 11th position in terms of exports.
In the last decade, Nepal's markets have been flooded by Chinese manufactured goods, mostly relatively cheap and of poor quality. While this has allowed poorer Nepalese access to products previously beyond their means, it also cripples the development of local manufacturing that could be a key to Nepal's development. Many of these imports are outdated or often substandard merchandise that could not be sold in China or exported to other countries. There are also pirated goods from big companies produced in lowland China and which are brought across the Tibetan plateau to Nepal. Typically, Nepali traders make contracts with Chinese or Chinese Muslim (Hui) traders who bring the products across Tibet. They rarely if ever go through Tibetan hands, and hence do not benefit local people. The products are then brought by Nepali traders across the border via Tatopani-Zhangmu and sold in Nepal.
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Disputes between Nepali traders and Chinese custom officials are frequent. Chinese customs might impose additional administrative restrictions, even after any duty as been paid. These restrictions are often far from transparent and if not arbitrary, certainly appear so. Meanwhile, on the other side of the border, Nepalese customs complain that bills, invoices and other documents required to calculate duties on imports are often incomplete or unrealistic.
A Nepali truck doing the Tibet trade. |
Chinese investment into Nepal is fast becoming very visible in parts of Kathmandu like Thamel and Jyatha. However, although joint ventures between Nepali entrepreneurs and Chinese investors generally work fine, many businesses run in Nepal by Chinese are amateurish and short-lived. Chinese entrepreneurs, who operate in a wholly different environment in China, find it difficult to adapt to Nepal's arcane and highly politicised labour practices. Some disputes have recently made headlines in Nepal. In July 2009, Hotel Beijing International in Jyatha, a Chinese-owned establishment, came under attack from unions for alleged non-implementation of labour laws. The dispute between the management and the union snowballed following interference by Chinese embassy officials. Trouble broke out when members of the General Federation of Nepalese Trade Unions (GEFONT) allegedly physically attacked the owners. The embassy then made representations to the Prime Minister, police, party leaders, the Hotel Association of Nepal and even the International Labour Organisation (ILO).
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The rising incidence of similar cases, particularly in Thamel, Kathmandu's main tourist area, has led Nepal's government to assure the Chinese embassy of its commitment to ensuring the safety and security of Chinese businessmen in the country. The Prime Minister and the Foreign minister spoke with the ambassador to this effect(19). Similar trouble was reported at another Chinese-owned establishment, Hotel Pyramid, a few months before the Hotel Beijing incident, where two officials from the Chinese embassy had got involved over the minimum wage dispute.
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The Chameliya hydro-electricity project in Nepal's far west Baitadi district has been beset with problems. In 2008, there were clashes between around 100 Chinese workers and 300-350 Nepalese. In a region where Nepal's Maoist movement was particularly strong and at a time when their party was the main coalition partner governing the country, the management sought political support by involving the Maoist-affiliated Chameliya Stakeholders Forum in the project, but to no avail. Tensions reached a climax during summer 2009. A main contention is the allegation by Nepali workers that the Chinese company, which had signed an agreement to pay a daily wage of NRs. 300 for an eight-hour day, actually paid only NRs. 200 while expecting up to 12 hours work a day.
Chinese workers play cards in Jyatha. |
For some years, Chinese officials and businesses have been exploring potential investments in Ayurveda, the traditional Hindu medical system, which, like in India, enjoys special state attention. In Nepal, Traditional Tibetan Medicine (TTM/Sowa Rigpa) is officially classified as part of Ayurveda. The transformation of TTM into a commercial resource is a major focus in the development plans drafted by the Chinese authorities for the TAR and other Tibetan regions. For 2010, the Chinese authorities have announced a strengthening of this policy(22).
China seems to be also particularly keen to participate in the exploitation of natural resources in Nepal. In the last fiscal year, 14 Chinese companies sought the government permission to extract alluvial gold, copper and natural gas. These companies have pledged investment of some NRs500 million (UK£4.5m; US$6.8m; EUR€5m). Of the total number of Chinese companies that expressed interest in investing in the mining sector during the fiscal year 2008-9, 11 were involved in extraction of alluvial gold. Other Chinese companies are eyeing Nepal's natural gas deposits and have also pledged investment in copper extraction.
Chinese investors are particularly interested in Nepal's hydropower potential, estimated in MWH per capita as amongst the highest in the world. China is said to have pledged investment, mostly in the form of loans, of over US$500 million for four hydroelectric projects. This new interest in Nepal's still nascent commercial electricity production might reflect a Chinese intention to prevent India, which has been involved in the sector for many years, from securing for itself the lucrative projects. But it also fits in with Beijing's plans for the TAR, in particular the development of energy-intensive mining projects(23).
China appears to be developing a broad web of institutions in Nepal that will flank and stabilise its current, twin programme of political influence and investment efforts. The recent establishment of a Nepal-China Media Forum is an example of this endeavour; the Nepal China Himalayan Friendship Society (NCHFS) in border regions has already been mentioned. Other organisations, like the China Information Center, Nepal China Executive Council, China Study Center and Nepal-China Investment Promotion Center, are already in place. The Chinese embassy in Kathmandu has also provided financial assistance to run Chinese language classes in Kathmandu University as well as several Confucius Institutes. Additionally, in 2008, the Chinese embassy took two Supreme Court officials to Beijing for training in information technology, and Chinese authorities have expressed interest in providing scholarship to judges and officers. According to myrepublica.com, the first scholarship to a Nepalese civilian officer was granted to Jaya Mukunda Khanal, a high District Officer in Kathmandu who is said to have played a significant role in curbing the Tibetan protests of 2008.
Attitudes
Despite continuing problems in border management, the astronomical trade imbalance between the two countries and the, so far, patchy outcome of Chinese investment in Nepal, the attitude of the Nepali establishment towards China is generally optimistic. This appears to be due to a firm determination to benefit from China's economic rise in order to escape Nepal's extreme underdevelopment, but also its almost total dependency on India, with which Nepal shares close cultural ties, but also a problematic political relationship(24). With a relatively small market and no natural resources comparable to, for instance, those of Mongolia, Nepal has in fact not much to offer to China(25). This is often compensated by a pre-emptive eagerness to acknowledge Chinese expectations on the 'One China' policy(26). As a result, Nepal's elites make painstaking efforts to match Chinese stances on Tibet with which it shares, next to geography, centuries of trans-Himalayan relations. Even though the relationship between Nepal and Tibet rarely, if ever had anything to do with China, it is currently being presented in Nepal in, at times, a bizarre fashion. For example, while opening an event jointly organised in Kathmandu in December 2007 by the China Association for Preservation and Development of Tibetan Culture (CAPDTC) and the Nepal Arniko Society(27) (NAS) ("Boosting the friendly exchanges between China and Nepal and promoting the preservation and development of Tibetan culture"). NAS's president, Harish Chandra Shah, said: "The profound and rich Tibetan culture has a long history, constituting a part and parcel of the Chinese culture and enriching the treasure house of diversified cultures of the world". An article published in 2008 in the economics magazine 'Via-Able', argues that the history of Nepal-Tibet trade relations can be traced back as early as the 4th century A.D, "even before the onset of Sino-Nepal relations". The article goes on to suggest that "50 to 60 years ago" Tibetans practiced subsistence agriculture on the basis of "slash-and-burn cultivation", and that "religious and humbled Tibetans" in a "once impoverished Tibet" are now "aggressively (...) involving [sic] in lucrative economic activities". "Tibetan watermelons", allegedly grown on once "almost deserted fields [turned] into arable land", are provided as an example of the alleged new dynamism, ignoring the fact that watermelons on sale in Tibet are brought there from Xinjiang or Gansu by the dominant Chinese Muslim (Hui) business community.
1: This is the second installment in a series of Updates and Special Reports in which TibetInfoNet explores China's policies towards Nepal and their relevance for Tibet.
2: Dingkye (Chin: Dingjie), Dingri, Nyalam (Chin: Nielamu), Kyirong (Chin: Jilong), Saga, Drongpa (Chin: Zhongba), and Purang (Chin: Pulan).
3: Taplejung, Sankhuwasabha, Solukhumbu. Dolkha, Sindhupalchok, Rasuwa, Gorkha, Manang, Mustang, Dolpa, Mugu, Humla, Bajhang and Dharchula.
4: Tatopani is the last village on the Nepali side of the border. Zhangmu - known in Tibetan as Dram and in Nepali as Khasa - is the first Tibetan town. It is situated a few kilometres behind the Bhote Kosi (Tibet River) which marks the actual border and can be crossed by the 'Friendship Bridge' constructed by the PRC in the 1960s.
5: Whereby, for geographical reasons, settlements tend to be further away from the border in Tibet than on the Nepali side.
6: Despite their name, Nepal's Maoist were rather an embarrassment for China, who in statements as in facts unambiguously sided with the conservative establishment around the King and the army.
7: Recent reports also indicate that cross-border syndicate are increasingly using Zhangmu as a hub for their activities. Motorcycles stolen in the Kathmandu valley for instance are brought across the border where they are resold at discount rates to Nepalis who cross the border to go shopping. Some of the stolen vehicles may be back in Nepal within a few days, albeit in the hands of new owners.
8: To help understand the reasons why Tibetans cross the Nepal-Tibet border clandestinely, see: Border shootings and travel restrictions (www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/58) and "If I have to die on the way, then so be it" (www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/60).
9: The figures include only direct aid to the government as of 2008 (source: Nepal government).
10: Note that, with nearly 40% of its oil coming from overseas, a figure certain to grow in the future, China is itself a net importer of oil.
11: A reader's comment by a Nepalese PhD student at Peking University, and a member of the China Study Centre in Kathmandu, posted in the newspaper Republica on 14 August 2009 reflects Nepali enthusiasm in the matter when it speculates: "Once this railway arrives at the Nepal-China border, does Nepal intend to plug into it at a single point or will this railway in future traverse Nepal at multiple points from north to south?".
12: See: More of the same, 19 January 2010 (https://www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/154)
13: Arniko, an outstanding architect of the 13th century from the Newar ethnic group in Kathmandu, was invited to Tibet by Phagpa Lama and later recommended by him to his religious disciple, the Mongol Kublai Khan, grandson of Genghis Khan and ruler over China, deemed in Chinese historiography as founder of the Yuan dynasty. Arniko conducted major projects in the Mongol empire and spent the rest of his life at Kublai's court in Beijing, never returning to Kathmandu. His name is often used today in connection with diverse ventures between China and Nepal.
14: Known in Nepal as Kerung or Chilun.
15: It appears that the decision to open the Zhangmu route in the 1960s was due to the then priority of keeping the distance as short as possible. Consideration for the handling of modern container trucks would naturally not have played a role.
16: See below.
17: This increase in Nepali exports to China is probably due to the cessation of Nepal's Maoist insurgency at that time and the subsequent growth in production.
18: See: Restrictions on the import of religious items from Nepal (www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/146)
19: Although keen to reassure observers that they do not intend to interfere in Nepal's internal affairs, and will abide by Nepali laws, China's diplomats in Kathmandu address Nepali institutions in a manner that hardly fits diplomatic conventions wherever they see Chinese interests affected. They also exert pressure through Chinese businesses in Nepal. Myrepublica.com has uncovered that a Chinese company offered work to a Nepali lawyer retained by an NGO working for Tibetan refugees under condition that he would stop defending that NGO for the closure of which the Chinese embassy was pressurising the Supreme Court. Chinese embassy staff also sent letters to police chiefs in Kathmandu and Bhaktapur praising them for thwarting Tibetan protests in 2008.
20: The recently drafted policy to accelerate the construction of airports in the TAR and rapidly open the region to air traffic with South Asia will probably mean an increase in flights in the foreseeable future.
21: In India, the problem of illegal Chinese economic migrants has been looming since the global crisis of 2008.
22: See: 'More of the same', 19 January 2010 (https://www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/154).
23: Although Tibet is regarded as 'Asia's water tower', in the short term, hydro-electricity production in the TAR faces challenges. Rivers there are very sandy and relatively shallow, and they also carry enormous seasonal fluctuations in terms of water volumes, conditions that render the construction of traditional dams difficult in many places.
24: A slogan often repeated in one version or other in Nepal is to 'correctly manage the Nepal-India-China triangle' in order to create a hypothetical 'equidistant' relationship between the two Asian giants.
25: This is perhaps best reflected in a candid statement made by Nepal's former Foreign Minister Chakra Bastola according to whom "it is not clear to what extent and what purpose China is interested in Nepal".
26: Official statistics for instance mostly list Hong Kong, Macau and even Taiwan under the letter C, following the entry 'China (P. R.)', whereby they qualify the two former territories as "Autonomous region of China P.R." and Taiwan, even when placed under T is labelled "Taiwan (China P.R.)".
27: See footnote 13.